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Abstract
Despite achieving remarkable success in various
domains, recent studies have uncovered the vul-
nerability of deep neural networks to adversar-
ial perturbations, creating concerns on model gen-
eralizability and new threats such as prediction-
evasive misclassification or stealthy reprogram-
ming. Among different defense proposals, stochas-
tic network defenses such as random neuron acti-
vation pruning or random perturbation to layer in-
puts are shown to be promising for attack mitiga-
tion. However, one critical drawback of current de-
fenses is that the robustness enhancement is at the
cost of noticeable performance degradation on le-
gitimate data, e.g., large drop in test accuracy. This
paper is motivated by pursuing for a better trade-
off between adversarial robustness and test accu-
racy for stochastic network defenses. We propose
Defense Efficiency Score (DES), a comprehensive
metric that measures the gain in unsuccessful at-
tack attempts at the cost of drop in test accuracy of
any defense. To achieve a better DES, we propose
hierarchical random switching (HRS), which pro-
tects neural networks through a novel randomiza-
tion scheme. A HRS-protected model contains sev-
eral blocks of randomly switching channels to pre-
vent adversaries from exploiting fixed model struc-
tures and parameters for their malicious purposes.
Extensive experiments show that HRS is superior
in defending against state-of-the-art white-box and
adaptive adversarial misclassification attacks. We
also demonstrate the effectiveness of HRS in de-
fending adversarial reprogramming, which is the
first defense against adversarial programs. More-
over, in most settings the average DES of HRS
is at least 5× higher than current stochastic net-
work defenses, validating its significantly improved
robustness-accuracy trade-off.
∗Equal Contribution
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have led to substantial im-
provements in the field of computer vision [Lecun et al.,
1998; Wang et al., 2018b], natural language processing [Hu
et al., 2014] and automatic decision making [Mazurowski
et al., 2008], and have influenced a broad range of real-
world applications. Nonetheless, even under a simple norm-
ball based input perturbation threat model, they are recently
shown to struggle with adversarial examples such as adversar-
ial misclassification attacks [Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfel-
low et al., 2015; Carlini and Wagner, 2017a; Su et al., 2018;
Zhao et al., 2018], or adversarial reprogramming [Elsayed et
al., 2018], bringing about increasing concerns on model gen-
eralizability and new security threats [Zhao et al., 2019].
Among different defense proposals, stochastic network de-
fenses are shown to be promising for mitigating adversarial
effects. The key idea is to replace a deterministic model
with a stochastic one, with some parameters being random-
ized. Popular stochastic network defenses include stochas-
tic activation pruning (SAP) [Dhillon et al., 2018], defensive
dropout [Wang et al., 2018a] and adding Gaussian noise [Liu
et al., 2017]. The variation of a stochastic model leads to
stochastic input gradients and therefore perplexes the adver-
sary when crafting adversarial examples. However, one crit-
ical drawback of current defenses is the noticeable drop in
model performance on legitimate data (particularly, the test
accuracy), resulting in an undesirable trade-off between de-
fense effectiveness and test accuracy.
In pursuit of a better trade-off between defense effective-
ness and test accuracy, in this paper we propose a novel
randomization scheme called hierarchical random switch-
ing (HRS). A HRS-protected network is made of a chain
of random switching blocks. Each block contains a bunch
of parallel channels with different weights and a random
switcher controlling which channel to be activated for tak-
ing the block’s input. In the run time, the input is propagated
through only the activated channel of each block and the ac-
tive channels are ever-switching. Note that each activated
path in HRS-protect model features decentralized randomiza-
tion for improved robustness but is also fully functional for le-
gitimate data, which is expected to yield a better trade-off. In
addition, different from the ensemble defense using multiple
different networks [Trame`r et al., 2017], HRS only requires
one single base network architecture to launch defense.
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To rigorously evaluate the adversarial robustness of the
proposed HRS method, in Section 6 we adopt the secu-
rity inspection principles suggested in [Athalye et al., 2018]
to verify the robustness claims1. Specifically, we mount
four widely used adversarial misclassification attack methods
(FGSM, CW, PGD and CW-PGD) under different scenarios,
including standard white-box and two adaptive white-box at-
tack settings. The adaptive attacks consider the setting where
the adversary has the additional knowledge of randomization
being deployed as defenses. The results show the superior
defense performance of HRS, and most importantly, ensuring
its robustness is indeed NOT caused by “security through ob-
scurity” such as gradient obfuscation [Athalye et al., 2018].
Below we summarize our main contributions.
• We propose a novel metric called defense efficiency score
(DES) that evaluates the trade-off between test accuracy
and defense rate on adversarial examples, which provides
a standardized approach to compare different defenses.
In particular, we analyze the trade-off in state-of-the-art
stochastic network defenses and adversarial training to mo-
tivate DES in Section 4.
• To achieve a better robustness-accuracy trade-off, in Sec-
tion 5 we propose hierarchical random switching (HRS),
an easily configurable stochastic network defense method
that achieves significantly higher DES than current meth-
ods. HRS is an attack-independent defense method that
can be easily mounted on the typical neural network train-
ing pipelines. We also develope a novel bottom-up training
algorithm with linear time complexity that can effectively
train a HRS-protected network.
• Compared with state-of-the-art stochastic defense methods
(SAP, defensive dropout and Gaussian noise), experiments
on MNIST and CIFAR-10 show that HRS exhibits much
stronger resiliency to adversarial attacks and simultane-
ously sacrifices less test accuracy. Moreover, HRS is an
effective defense against the considered powerful adaptive
attacks that break other stochastic network defenses, which
can be explained by its unique decentralized randomization
feature (see Section 5 for details).
• HRS can effectively mitigate different adversarial threats.
In Section 7, we show that HRS is an effective defense
against adversarial reprogramming [Elsayed et al., 2018].
To the best of our knowledge, this paper proposes the first
defense against adversarial reprogramming.
2 Adversarial Threats
2.1 Adversarial Misclassification Attack
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [Goodfellow et al.,
2015] is a “one-shot” attack that generates an adversarial ex-
ample x′ by taking one step gradient update in the `∞ neigh-
borhood of input image x with a step size .
Carlini & Wagner (CW) attack [Carlini and Wagner,
2017b] formulates the search for adversarial examples by
solving the following optimization problem:
minimizeδ D(δ) + c · f(x+ δ) s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (1)
1Appendices and codes: https://github.com/KieranXWang/HRS
where δ denotes the perturbation to x. D(δ) is the distortion
metric; f is a designed attack objective for misclassification;
and the optimal term c > 0 is obtained by binary search.
Projected Gradient Decent (PGD) [Madry et al., 2017] is
an iterative attack that applies FGSM with a small step size
α. It controls the distortion of adversarial examples through
clipping the updated image so that the new image stays in the
 neighborhood of x. For the t-th iteration, the adversarial
image generation process is:
x′t+1 =
∏
x+S
(x′t − α · sign(∇(losst(x)))) (2)
where
∏
x+S means projection to S, the allowed perturbation
in an `∞ ball centered at x, sign applies element-wise, and
∇loss(·) is the gradient of misclassification loss.
CW-PGD [Athalye et al., 2018] applies the loss term f in
CW attack to PGD attack. Different from CW attack, CW-
PGD can directly control the level of distortion by clipping
updated images into an l∞ ball of radius .
2.2 Adversarial Reprogramming
Adversarial reprogramming [Elsayed et al., 2018] is a re-
cent adversarial threat that aims at “reprogramming” a target
model trained on task Ta into performing another task Tb. It
is accomplished by learning an input transformation hf and
an output transformation hg that bridge the inputs and outputs
of Ta and Tb. After reprogramming, the computational cost
of performing task Tb only depends on hf and hg , so that the
attacker can stealthily exploit the target model.
3 Stochastic Network Defenses: Motivation
and Background
Here we provide some motivation and background on why
and how randomness can be exploited to defend against ad-
versarial attacks. We are particularly interested in stochastic
network defenses due to the following reasons: (i) they ex-
hibit promising robustness performance; (ii) they are easily
compatible with typical neural network training procedures;
and (iii) they do not depend on specific adversarial attacks for
training robust models, such as adversarial training [Goodfel-
low et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017].
3.1 Motivation
Why randomness can be useful in defending adversarial at-
tacks? Here we conduct two sets of experiments and report
some insightful observations. First, we find that following a
randomly selected direction, the possibility of finding a suc-
cessful adversarial example is very low. Second, we find that
when training models with the same network architecture but
with different weight initialization, each model has its own
vulnerable spots. Details of these experiments can be found
in Appendix1 A.
Combining these two findings, one can reach an intuitive
motivation on why stochastic network defenses can be ef-
fective. As adversarial attacks are associated with worst-
case performance and the model vulnerability varies with ini-
tial weight randomization, a successful attack on a stochastic
model requires finding a common weakness that applies to
Model Deviation Defense Rate (%)
Base 0 29.18
SAP 0.0343 29.40
Dropout 0.1 0.1143 29.60
Dropout 0.3 0.2295 29.63
Dropout 0.7 0.5186 32.62
Gaussian 0.6413 39.92
HRS 10× 10 0.7376 61.03
HRS 20× 20 0.7888 66.67
HRS 30× 30 0.7983 69.70
Table 1: Input gradient standard deviation and mean defense rate (1 -
attack success rate) under PGD attack of multiple strengths. Details
are in Section 6. A visualization plot is given in Appendix A.3.
ALL stochastic model variants. This indicates that finding
an effective adversarial example for a randomized network is
strictly more difficult than that for a deterministic model.
3.2 Background
There are many defense methods that utilize randomness ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly. Here we summarize three repre-
sentative works toward this direction.
Stochastic Activation Pruning (SAP). Stochastic activa-
tion pruning (SAP), proposed by Dhillon et al. [Dhillon et
al., 2018], randomizes the neural network by stochastically
dropping neuron outputs with a weighted probability. After
pruning, the remaining neuron outputs are properly scaled up
according to the number of pruned neurons.
Defensive Dropout. Wang et al. [Wang et al., 2018a] pro-
pose defensive dropout that applies dropout [Srivastava et al.,
2014] in the inference phase for defense. Defensive dropout
differs from SAP in two aspects. First, it drops neurons
equally regardless of their magnitudes. Second, defensive
dropout is implemented in both training and testing phases,
with possibly different rates.
Gaussian Noise. Liu et al. [Liu et al., 2017] introduce ran-
domness to the network by adding Gaussian noise before each
convolutional layer. Similar to defensive dropout, Gaussian
noise takes place in both training and testing phases. The
authors suggest to use different noise deviations for the in-
put convolutional layer and other convolutioanl layers, which
they refer to as ”init-noise” and ”inner-noise” respectively.
3.3 Stochastic Gradients
One unique property of stochastic models is the consequence
of stochastic input gradients when performing backpropaga-
tion from the model output to the input. By inspecting the
mean standard deviation of input gradient under different at-
tack strengths (`∞ constraint) over each input dimension, we
find that it is strongly correlated with the defense perfor-
mance, as shown in Table ??. By simply mounting a white-
box attack (PGD), we find that SAP becomes as vulnerable
as the base (deterministic) model, and defensive dropout and
Gaussian noise have little defense effects. However, defenses
that have larger standard deviations of the input gradient, such
as the proposed HRS method (see Section 5 for details), are
Figure 1: An example of input gradient distribution of stochastic
defense models on a randomly selected dimension. We sample the
input gradient of each defense for 200 times at the first step of CW-
PGD attack. While SAP, dropout and Gaussian noise all yield a
unimodal distribution, this trend is less obvious for HRS.
still quite resilient to this white-box attack. For visual com-
parison, an example of different stochastic models’ input gra-
dient distributions under the same attack is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.
4 Defense Efficiency Score: Quantifying
Robustness-Accuracy Trade-off
For most current defense methods, there are factors control-
ling the defense strength. For example, in adversarial train-
ing [Madry et al., 2017], one can achieve different defense
strength by using different L∞ bounds on adversarial pertur-
bations during training. Analogously, for stochastic defenses,
the controlling factors are the randomization sources, such
as the dropout rate, variance of Gaussian noise or the width
(number of channels) in our proposed HRS approach.
We note that although defense effectiveness can be im-
proved by using a stronger defense controlling factor, it is
traded by sacrificing the test accuracy on clean examples. We
characterize this scenario in Figure 2, where the points of a
certain defense method are given by using different strength
factors against the same attack. For any tested defense, there
is indeed a robustness-accuracy trade-off where stronger de-
fenses are usually associated with more test accuracy drop.
For example, on CIFAR-10 and under an `∞ attack strength
of 8/255, when adversarial training [Madry et al., 2017]
achieves a 56.6% defense rate, it also causes a 7.11% drop
in test accuracy, which could be an undesirable trade-off.
Therefore, it is worth noting that even under the same
norm-ball bounded adversarial attack threat model, compar-
ing different defense methods is not an easy task as they vary
in both defense rate and test accuracy. In order to tackle this
difficulty, we propose Defense Efficiency Score (DES) as
DESD,A(θ) = ∆d/∆t (3)
Dropout 0.815
Gaussian 6.176
Adv. Train 7.367
HRS 35.429
Defense
Methods
Mean
DES
Figure 2: Defense efficiency of different defenses under PGD attack
on CIFAR-10. See Appendix C.5 for implementation details. The
solid lines are fitted by linear regression.
where ∆d is the gain in defense rate (percentage of adver-
sarial examples generated by attack A that fails to fool the
protected model using defense scheme D with strength fac-
tor θ) and ∆t is the associated test accuracy drop relative to
the unprotected base model2. Intuitively, DES indicates the
defense improvement per test accuracy drop.
A fair evaluation of defenses can be conducted by first
choosing a desired behavior range (on either defense rate or
test accuracy drop), and then compare the statistics (such
as mean and variance) of DES values by varying defense
strength that fall into the desired range. In Figure 2 we show
the scatter plot and mean of DES values of HRS (with up
to 30 X 30 channels), together with other stochastic defenses
and adversarial training that have the same defense rate range.
We find that the points (resulting models) of a defense lie
roughly on a linear line with a small variance and our pro-
posed HRS defense attains the best mean DES that is more
than 3× higher than the state of the art, suggesting a signifi-
cantly more effective defense. Details of HRS and DES anal-
ysis will be given in Section 5 and Section 6, respectively.
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Figure 3: Illustration of HRS-protected model.
5 Hierarchical Random Switching (HRS)
5.1 HRS Protected Model
HRS divides a base neural network into several blocks and
replaces each block with a switching block which contains a
bunch of parallel channels with different weights but the same
2In practice, we use ∆d/(∆t+ η) where η is a small value (we
set η = 0.002) to offset noisy effect (e.g. random training initializa-
tion) leading to negative ∆t when it is close to the origin.
structure as shown in Figure 3. HRS features a switcher that
randomly assigns the input of the block to one of the parallel
channels in the run time. We call the selected channel by the
switcher an active channel, and at any given time all active
channels from each block constitute an active path which has
the same structure as the base model.
Intuitively, a HRS-protected model can assure comparable
performance to the base model if each possible path is fully
functional while its random switching nature prevents the at-
tacker from exploiting the weakness of a fixed model struc-
ture. We will introduce a training procedure to ensure full
function of each path shortly.
HRS has two main advantages over current stochastic de-
fenses. First, many defenses introduce randomness by drop-
ping neurons or adding noise, leading to undesirable and even
disruptive noisy information for model inference, deteriorat-
ing accuracy on legitimate data. This explains why these
methods have worse trade-offs in terms of DES, as shown
in Figure 2. In contrast, HRS introduces randomness in block
switching, where each active path in HRS is trained to have
a comparable performance to the base model, which greatly
alleviates the issue of significant drop in test accuracy.
Second, HRS is a decentralized randomization scheme.
Each variant of HRS has no privilege over others due to ran-
dom switching. Therefore, it is fundamentally different from
Dropout or Gaussian noise where all variations are derived
from the base deterministic model, making the base model
a centralized surrogate model and potentially leveraged by
attackers to bypass these defenses. We consider this attack
setting as the ”fixed-randomness” setting, which is an adap-
tive white-box attack assuming the attacker knows the base
model and is aware of randomness being deployed as de-
fenses. In Section 6, we will show our proposed HRS is re-
silient to such adaptive attack, attaining even better defense
performance than standard white-box attacks.
5.2 Training for HRS
To facilitate HRS model training and ensure the performance
of every path, we propose a bottom-up training approach.
The training process start with training for the first switching
block by constructing N1 randomly initialized paths. These
paths are trained independently to convergence, and after this
round of training the weights in the first switching block will
be fixed. We then train for the second switching block by con-
structing N2 paths with randomly initialization except for the
first switching block. During training, the switching scheme
of the first block is activated, which forces the following up-
per blocks to adapt the variation of the first block. The train-
ing process continues until all switching blocks are trained.
We find that by doing so, the training performance is stable,
and each channel in a switching block is decentralized. De-
tails of the bottom-up training approach are summarized in
Algorithm 1 of Appendix B.
6 Performance Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we run experiments on two datasets, MNIST
[LeCun, 1998] and CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky and Hinton,
2009], to benchmark our proposed HRS on defending ad-
versarial attacks. The study consists of two parts. In the
first part, We test HRS with different channels and three
other stochastic network defenses in white-box attack setting
(i.e. assume the attacker has full information about the target
model including its structure and parameters) and two adap-
tive attack settings where the attackers attempt to incorpo-
rate randomness-aware counter-measures to strengthen their
attacks at possibly additional computation cost. Note that for
a fair comparison, we need to consider both defense effec-
tiveness and test accuracy. Thus we set defenses to the same
accuracy level by tuning their strength controlling factors and
report detailed accuracy values in C.6 of Appendix C.
In the second part we provide a comprehensive study on
the trade-off between defense performance and drop in test
accuracy of each method via the DES introduced in Section
4. We not only compare among different stochastic defense
methods but also implememt adversarial training [Madry et
al., 2017], a state-of-the-art deterministic defense method3.
6.1 Experiment Settings
Base Network Models
For a fair comparison all defenses have to be applied on the
same unprotected model (base model). We use two con-
volutional neural network (CNN) architectures as our base
models for MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets, respectively, as
they were standard settings considered in previous works
such as [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b; Papernot et al., 2016;
Chen et al., 2017]. Details about these base models are sum-
marized in Appendix C.4.
Stochastic Network Defense Schemes
Below summarizes the implemented defenses, and Table A2
in Appendix D shows their resulting test accuracy.
• SAP [Dhillon et al., 2018] : Stochastic activation pruning
(SAP) scheme is implemented on the base model between
the first and second fully-connected layers.
• Defensive Dropout [Wang et al., 2018a]: dropout is used
between the first and second fully-connected layers with
three different dropout rates, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.7 (0.7 is omitted
on MNIST as it severely degrades test accuracy).
• Gaussian Noise: Following the setting in [Liu et al., 2017],
we add Gaussian noise to the input of each convolutional
layer in both training and testing phases. We defer its pa-
rameter setting and discussion to Appendix C.2.
• HRS (proposed): We divide the base model structure
into two switching blocks between the first and second
fully-connected layers. We implement this 2-block HRS-
protected model with 10×10, 20×20 and 30×30 channels.
Note that at any given time, the active path of HRS has the
same structure as the base model.
Attack Settings
We consider the standard white-box attack setting and two
adaptive white-box attacks settings (expectation over trans-
formation (EOT)[Athalye et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018]
and fixed randomness) for stochastic defenses. The purpose
3We only compare adversarial training on CIFAR-10, as on
MNIST it does not suffer from large test accuracy drop.
Figure 4: Attack success rate on CIFAR-10 using (a) PGD, (b) PGD
+ EOT, (c) PGD + fixed randomness (d) CW-PGD, (e) CW-PGD +
EOT, and (f) CW-PGD + fixed randomness.
of using EOT and fixed randomness attacks is to show the
defense effectiveness is not a consequence of obfuscated gra-
dients. In each setting, four adversarial attack methods are
implemented: FGSM, CW, PGD and CW-PGD. Their imple-
mentation details are summarized in Appendix C.1.
• White-box Attack: The adversary uses the stochastic
model directly to generate adversarial examples.
• Expectation Over Transformation (EOT): When com-
puting input gradient, the adversary samples input gradient
for n times and use the mean of gradients to update the per-
turbed example. We set n = 10 in our experiments as we
observe no significant gain when using n > 10. Details
about the pilot research on n are given in Appendix C.5.
• Fixed Randomness: Generating adversarial examples us-
ing a fixed model by disabling any randomness scheme. For
SAP, defensive dropout and Gaussian noise, it is done by re-
moving their randomness generation modules (e.g. dropout
layers). For HRS, it is done by fixing an active path.
6.2 White-box and Adaptive Attack Analysis
Due to space limitation, we compare the attack success rate
(ASR) of different defenses on CIFAR-10 dataset against
PGD and CW-PGD attacks with different strengths (the `∞
constraint) and under three attack settings in Figure 4. We
defer the experimental results of FGSM and CW and all at-
tacks on MNIST dataset to Appendix C.1.
We summarize our findings from experiments as follows:
1. HRS achieves superior defense performance under all
attack settings. The advantage of HRS over other de-
fenses becomes more apparent under stronger attacks
such as PGD and CW-PGD, where SAP, defensive
dropout and Gaussian noise provide little defense given
the same level of test accuracy drop. For example,
even with a reasonably large `∞ perturbation constraint
8/255, on CIFAR-10 PGD and CW-PGD attacks only
Figure 5: Scatter plots of different defenses. Attacks on CIFAR-10
and MNIST are using 8/255 and 64/255  bounds, respectively.
attain 51.1% and 54.5% ASRs on HRS with only at most
0.48% drop in test accuracy, respectively, while all other
stochastic defenses are completely broken (100% ASR),
and adversarial training with the same defense rate has
7% more test accuracy drop.
2. The adaptive attacks using EOT can marginally improve
ASR on all defenses when compared with the standard
white-box attacks. But it is not as efficient as fixed-
randomness attack or white-box attack as it requires n
times gradient computations.
3. We observe that the fixed randomness adaptive attack
leads to distinct consequences to different defense meth-
ods. For SAP, dropout and Gaussian noise, it has a simi-
lar effect as using EOT but without requiring multiple in-
put gradient samples. However, for HRS it actually has
a worse performance than standard white-box attacks.
This phenomenon can be explained by the decentralized
randomness property of HRS as discussed in Section 5.
4. We observe that HRS with more channels are stronger
in defense. Note that HRS introduces little computation
overhead than the base model and it has large DEI score.
In practice, further reduction of ASR with HRS can be
achieved by simply allowing more channels or blocks.
6.3 Defense Efficiency Analysis
To characterize the robustness-accuracy trade-offs of differ-
ent defenses, we compare the DES (see Section 4) of different
stochastic defense methods in Table ??. Our HRS attains the
highest DES on CIFAR-10 for all attacks and on MNIST for
most attacks. In particular, HRS outperforms other defenses
by a large margin (at least by 3×) on CIFAR-10.
7 First Defense against Adversarial
Reprogramming
In addition to defending adversarial misclassification attacks,
here we demonstrate the effectiveness of HRS against adver-
sarial reprogramming [Elsayed et al., 2018]. We use the same
Dataset Defense FGSM PGD CW-PGD
MNIST
Dropout 11.99 17.94 19.55
Gaussian 14.90 71.78 82.76
HRS 36.41 76.64 74.90
CIFAR-10
Dropout 1.09 0.81 0.76
Gaussian 2.73 6.17 5.47
Adv. Train 5.05 7.37 6.57
HRS 32.23 35.43 35.55
Table 2: Mean DES of different defense methods
Figure 6: Adversarial reprogramming test accuracy during training
a locally connected layer with different kernels as input transform.
base network on CIFAR-10 in Section 6 as the target model
to be reprogrammed to classify MNIST images. We use a
locally connected layer to perform the input transformation
with different kernel sizes and use an identical mapping as
the output transformation. The unprotected classifier can eas-
ily be reprogrammed to achieve up to 90.53% and 95.07%
test accuracy using kernel sizes 2× 2 and 3× 3, respectively,
on classifying MNIST images after several epochs of training
for the input transformation.
We compare the defenses against adversarial reprogram-
ming using the same set of defense methods in Section 6 and
show the reprogramming test accuracy during 50 epochs of
training in Figure 6. We observe that HRS-protected models
can significantly reduce the adversarial reprogramming test
accuracy whereas all other defenses have less defense effect.
8 Conclusion
To fairly characterize the robustness-accuracy trade-offs of
different defenses, in this paper we propose a novel and com-
prehensive metric called defense efficiency score (DES). In
addition, towards achieving a better trade-off, we propose hi-
erarchical random switching (HRS) for defense, which can be
easily compatible with typical network training procedures.
Experimental results show that HRS has superior defense per-
formance against standard and adaptive adversarial misclassi-
fication attacks while attaining significantly higher DES than
current stochastic network defenses. HRS is also the first ef-
fective defense against adversarial reprogramming.
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A Motivation of Using Randomness
A.1 Motivation 1
Figure A1: Distribution of adversarial examples for a group of
model individuals of the same architecture. Each grid shows the
relative positions of adversarial examples to the clean image (the ori-
gin) on two randomly selected input dimensions. Here, the distances
of adversarial examples on the given x-y plane are normalized. Ad-
versarial examples are generated by CW-PGD attack.
We find that when training models with the same net-
work architecture but with different weight initialization,
each model has its own vulnerable spots. Figure A1 shows
the adversarial examples found by the same attack for each
model. These models all have the same architecture, train-
ing process and performance in terms of test accuracy and
defense capability. However, it is surprising that the distri-
bution of adversarial examples for each model is not concen-
trated but quite scattered. This indicates that each model has
its own robustness characteristics even though they are iden-
tical on the macro scope.
A.2 Motivation 2
We find that following a randomly selected direction, the pos-
sibility of finding a successful adversarial example is very
low. Figure A2 shows the changes of the logit (pre-softmax)
layer representations and the training losses. One can ob-
serve that their changes are quite subtle and thus the model
is actually quite robust to perturbations guided by random di-
rections. In contrast, when comparing to the changes of an
adversarial direction made by interpolating between a pair of
original example and adversarial example found by perform-
ing targeted CW-PGD attack, the logit of the target class has
a notable increase, shown in Figure A3. This indicates that
although DNNs can be robustness to random perturbations, it
still lacks worst-case robustness and thus becomes vulnerable
to adversarial attacks.
A.3 Input Gradient Deviation v.s. Mean Defense
Rate
Figure A2: Examples of logits and loss changes in random direc-
tions.
Figure A3: Examples of logits and loss changes in (targeted) ad-
versarial directions. Adversarial directions are found by performing
CW-PGD attack on the clean image (origin).
Figure A4: Input gradient variance is highly correlated with defense
effectiveness for stochastic defenses.
B Training for HRS
Algorithm 1 Training HRS-protected Model
Require:
HRS model architecture with M switching blocks. N i
denotes the number channels in block i and cji denotes
the j’s channel in block i.
1: for block i ∈ [1,M ] do
2: for channel j ∈ [1, Ni] do
3: Construct a HRS Model with M blocks:
4: for block k ∈ [1,M ] do
5: if k < i then
6: Construct Ni channels with trained channels
{clk | l ∈ [1, Nk]};
7: Freeze channels in block k;
8: else
9: Construct 1 channel for block k with randomly
initialized weights;
10: Set all channels in block k to be trainable;
11: end if
12: Train all trainable channels to convergence;
13: Save trained channel cji ;
14: end for
15: end for
16: end for
17: return A HRS Model with trained channels {cji | i ∈
[1,M ], j ∈ [1, Ni]}
C Experiment Details
C.1 Attack Details
All attacks are implemented in a white-box, targeted attack
setting for a fair comparison. For reproducibility of the ex-
periments, we summarize the hyper-parameters we used for
each attack.
• FGSM: No hyper-parameter needs to specify. Different
attack strengths are given by varying the step size .
• CW: We run CW attack with L2 distortion metric. We
run gradient descent for 100 iterations with step size of
0.1 and use 10 rounds binary search finding the optimal
weight factor c. Different attack strengths are given by
varying the confidence factor κ.
• PGD: We run gradient descent for 100 iterations with
step size of 0.1. Different attack strengths are given by
varying maximum allowed L∞ perturbation .
• CW-PGD: The same setting as PGD.
C.2 Defense Implementation of Gaussian Noise
On MNIST, we use the recommended standard deviations
which are 0.2 for the ”init-noise” (noise before the input
layer) and 0.1 for the ”inner-noise” (noise before other conv
layers). However, on CIFAR-10 we found this setting de-
creases test accuracy significantly (reducing to 60%), thus
we use 10× smaller deviations (0.02 and 0.01 respectively).
We also found that using Gaussian noise solely is not suffi-
cient to prevent the model from over-fitting. As a solution
we also use dropout during training in order to prevent over-
fitting.
C.3 Pilot Research on EOT
We run a pilot test to determine the value of n for EOT at-
tacks. We find using n = 10 is enough as the benefits of
using a larger n saturates when n > 10. An example of using
different n values for EOT is given in Figure A5. Here we
also plot Gaussian defense with a 3× larger noise deviation
which is not in Section 6.2 as it drops the test accuracy to
76.83%. The purpose is to show that the defenses that seem
to be less sensitive to EOT (as shown by the lines on the top
of Figure A5) do not indicate they are truly resistant to EOT.
C.4 Model Architecture
Table A1: Base model architectures for MNIST and CIFAR-10
Datasets.
Model for MNIST Model for CIFAR-10
Conv layer 32 filters with size (3,3) 64 filters with size (3,3)
Conv layer 32 filters with size (3,3) 64 filters with size (3,3)
Pooling layer pool size (2,2) pool size (2,2)
Conv layer 64 filters with size (3,3) 128 filters with size (3,3)
Conv layer 64 filters with size (3,3) 128 filters with size (3,3)
Pooling layer pool size (2,2) pool size (2,2)
Fully connected 200 units 256 units
Fully connected 200 units 256 units
Output layer 10 units 10 units
Figure A5: Pilot Research on EOT.
C.5 Implementation Details on Study of Defense
Efficiency
Spots of HRS are due to different number of block channels
ranging from 5 × 5 to 30 × 30. Spots of dropout are due to
different training and testing dropout rate ranging from 0.1 to
0.9. Spots of Gaussian noise are due to different initial and
inner Gaussian noise deviations ranging from (0.01, 0.005)
to (0.11, 0.055) on CIFAR-10 and from (0.1, 0.05) to (0.325,
0.1625) respectively. Spots of Adversarial Training are due
to different  bounds from 0.5/255 to 4.5/255 of adversarial
examples used in training.
C.6 Test Accuracy
Table A2: Test accuracy of different defense methods.
Model MNIST Dev.(e-4) CIFAR Dev.(e-4)
Base 99.04% / 79.17 % /
SAP 99.02% 1.47 79.16 % 2.81
Dropout 0.1 98.98% 3.45 79.08% 7.99
Dropout 0.3 98.68% 6.06 78.65 % 16.67
Dropout 0.7 / / 76.02 % 24.52
Gaussian 99.02% 5.82 78.04 % 7.25
HRS 10*10 98.95% 5.33 78.93% 26.81
HRS 20*20 98.91% 6.02 78.76% 20.32
HRS 30*30 98.85% 8.31 78.69% 23.25
D Experimental Results
D.1 MNIST
Figure A6: Attack success rate of FGSM on different defenses. Figure A7: Attack success rate of CW on different defenses.
Figure A8: Attack success rate of PGD on different defenses. Figure A9: Attack success rate of CW-PGD on different defenses.
D.2 CIFAR-10
Figure A10: Attack success rate of FGSM on different defenses. Figure A11: Attack success rate of CW on different defenses.
E Adversarial Reprogramming
The number of parameters in the input transformation is cru-
cial factor to achieve high reprogramming accuracy. We
applied the original input transformation in [Elsayed et al.,
2018] to our CIFAR to MNIST reprogramming task but find
the reprogramming performance is poor due to the lack of pa-
rameters in input transformation. In order to differentiate de-
fense effectiveness under a strong reprogramming setting, we
use a local-connected layer as input transformation. The ad-
vantage of local-connected layer is that we can easily control
the number of parameters by setting different kernel sizes.
We found that using a 3 × 3 kernel lead to 95.07% accu-
racy which is similar to reported accuracy in [Elsayed et al.,
2018]. We show experiment results using other kernel sizes in
the following and it is clear that using a larger kernel (a large
number of parameters) will lead to higher reprogramming ac-
curacy. However, under all experiment settings we found our
proposed defense demonstrate much stronger defense (lower
reprogramming accuracy) compared to other defenses.
F Supplementary Experiments
F.1 The Effect of Increasing Switching Blocks
In Table A3 we compare HRS models with 1, 2 and 3 switch-
ing blocks. For all models in the comparison, there are 5
channels in each block. Thus the parameter size of these 3
models are the same. It is noted that by increasing the num-
ber of switching blocks, the resistance against adversarial at-
tacks can be improved. So the benefit of using more switching
blocks is increasing model variation given certain parameter
size, and thus improving the defending effectiveness. Yet the
improvement is traded with more test accuracy drop. The
test accuracy of these three models are 78.78%, 78.74% and
74.92% respectively. Therefore, the number of blocks of a
HRS model can be treated as a defense strength controlling
factor.
Table A3: Defense Effectiveness (in terms of ASR) of HRS with
different number of blocks. The experiment is conducted on CIFAR-
10 dataset using CW-PGD attack with different  bounds.
Strength 1/255 2/255 4/255 6/255 8/255
1-block 5.6% 16.4% 46.7% 76.7% 85.5%
2-block 3.3% 10.0% 35.6% 64.3% 81.2%
3-block 2.9% 13.1% 33.7% 55.2% 65.9%
